Freedom on the Net 2014 - Tightening the Net: Governments Expand Online Controls (Summary) by Adrian Shahbaz et al.
FREEDOM  
ON THE NET
2014
Tightening the Net:  
Governments Expand Online Controls
Cover: Photo from an antigovernment protest outside the ruling party’s headquarters in Bangkok, 
Thailand on November 29, 2013. Photo: Shutterstock.
This report was made possible by the generous support of the  
Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the U.S. State Department’s  
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL), Google,  
and Yahoo. The content of this publication is the sole responsibility  
of Freedom House and does not necessarily represent the views  
of the Dutch Foreign Ministry, DRL, Google, or Yahoo.
Tightening the Net:  1 
Governments Expand  
Online Controls
Major Trends 4
Emerging Threats 9
The Global Struggle 12 
for Internet Freedom
Tables, Charts, and Graphs 
Key Internet Controls 14 
by Country
65 Country Score Comparison 16 
Map of Internet Freedom 18
Regional Graphs 20
Internet Freedom vs. 22 
Press Freedom
Internet Freedom vs. 23 
Internet Penetration
Overview of Score Changes 24
Methodology 26
Checklist of Questions 28
Contributors 34 
This booklet is a summary of findings for the 2014 edition of Freedom on the Net.  
A full volume with 65 country reports assessed in this year’s study can be found on  
our website at www.freedomhouse.org.
1In a departure from the past, when most governments 
preferred a behind-the-scenes approach to internet 
control, countries are rapidly adopting new laws  
that legitimize existing repression and effectively 
criminalize online dissent. 
As a result, more people are being arrested for their 
internet activity than ever before, online media outlets 
are increasingly pressured to censor themselves or 
face legal penalties, and private companies are facing 
new demands to comply with government requests 
for data or deletions.
Some states are using the revelations of widespread 
surveillance by the U.S. National Security Agency 
(NSA) as an excuse to augment their own monitoring 
capabilities, frequently with little or no oversight,  
and often aimed at the political opposition and  
human rights activists.
The growing restrictions at the national level are  
also changing the nature of the global internet,  
transforming it from a worldwide network into a frag- 
mented mosaic, with both the rules and the accessi-
ble content varying from one country to another.
Blocking and filtering—once the most widespread 
methods of censorship—are still very common, but 
many countries now prefer to simply imprison users 
who post undesirable content, thereby deterring 
others and encouraging self-censorship. This ap-
proach can present the appearance of a technically 
uncensored internet while effectively limiting certain 
types of speech. Meanwhile, physical violence against 
internet users appears to have decreased in scope. 
In 2013, Freedom House documented 26 countries 
where government critics and human rights defenders 
were subjected to beatings and other types of phys-
ical violence in connection with their online activity; 
that number fell to 22 in 2014.
Tightening the Net: Governments Expand Online Controls
By Sanja Kelly, Madeline Earp, Laura Reed, Adrian Shahbaz, and Mai Truong
Internet freedom around the world has declined for the fourth consecutive  
year, with a growing number of countries introducing online censorship and 
monitoring practices that are simultaneously more aggressive and more  
sophisticated in their targeting of individual users. 
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Key Reasons for Decline in Internet Freedom, 2013–14:
• Proliferation of repressive laws
• Increased surveillance
•  New regulatory controls over 
online media
•  More arrests of  
social-media users 
•  Intensified demands on  
private sector
•  New threats facing women  
and LGBTI population 
•  More sophisticated and  
widespread cyberattacks
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2Tracking the Global Decline
 
To illuminate the nature of the principal threats in  
this rapidly changing environment, Freedom House 
conducted a comprehensive study of internet 
freedom in 65 countries around the world. This report 
is the fifth in its series and focuses on developments 
that occurred between May 2013 and May 2014. The 
previous edition, covering 60 countries, was published 
in October 2013. Freedom on the Net 2014 assesses a 
greater variety of political systems than its predeces-
sors, while tracing improvements and declines in  
the countries examined in previous editions. Over  
70 researchers, nearly all based in the countries they 
analyzed, contributed to the project by examining 
laws and practices relevant to the internet, testing  
the accessibility of select websites, and interviewing  
a wide range of sources.
Of the 65 countries assessed, 36 have experienced a 
negative trajectory since May 2013. The most signifi-
cant declines were in Russia, Turkey, and Ukraine. The 
Russian government took multiple steps to increase 
control over the online sphere, particularly in advance 
of the Sochi Olympic Games and during the ongo-
ing crisis in Ukraine. In Turkey, the blocking of social 
media, limits on circumvention tools, cyberattacks 
against opposition news sites, and assaults on online 
journalists were among the most prominent threats 
during the year. Ukraine’s standing declined primarily 
due to violence targeting social-media users and  
online journalists during the Euromaidan protests,  
an increase in cyberattacks, and new evidence reveal-
ing the extent to which the administration of ousted 
president Viktor Yanukovych had been conducting 
online surveillance of activists, journalists, and  
opposition leaders.
Iran, Syria, and China were the world’s worst abusers 
of internet freedom overall. Users in China were  
intimidated and arrested during crackdowns on  
online “rumors” as President Xi Jinping consolidated 
control over social media. In September 2014, the 
same month that students in Hong Kong used the 
Of the 65 countries assessed, 36 have  
experienced a negative trajectory since 
May 2013.
world’s third-fastest internet connection to mobilize 
prodemocracy demonstrations, mainland courts sen-
tenced prominent Uighur academic and webmaster 
Ilham Tohti to life imprisonment, the harshest punish-
ment for online dissent in years. Syria was the most 
dangerous country in the world for citizen journalists, 
with dozens killed in the past year, while progovern-
ment hackers reportedly infected 10,000 computers 
with malware disguised as warnings against potential 
cyberattacks. And despite early enthusiasm over 
the election of reformist president Hassan Rouhani, 
Iran maintained its position as the worst country for 
internet freedom in 2014. Authorities continued to 
hand down harsh punishments, sentencing people 
to lengthy prison terms for promoting Sufism online, 
among other digital activities. 
Very few countries registered any gains in internet 
freedom, and the improvements that were recorded 
largely reflected less vigorous application of existing 
internet controls compared with the previous year, 
rather than genuinely new and positive steps taken 
by the government. The year’s biggest improvement 
occurred in India, where authorities relaxed restric-
tions on access and content that had been imposed 
in 2013 to help quell rioting in northeastern states.
Another country that registered a notable improve-
ment is Brazil, where after years of debate and  
revision, lawmakers approved a bill known as the  
Marco Civil da Internet that contains important  
provisions governing net neutrality and ensuring 
strong privacy protections. Freedom House also  
documented an improvement in Belarus, mainly  
because the political environment was less volatile 
and the government eased enforcement of some 
restrictions, even as citizens increasingly used the 
internet to voice their views.
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Russia’s score declined by 11 points over the past 5 years. Since 
Putin’s return to the presidency in 2012, the government has enacted 
multiple laws to block online content, including critical or opposition 
media outlets. Individuals are subject to prosecution and physical 
violence for their internet activity and increasingly extensive surveil-
lance of ICTs lacks sufficient judicial oversight.
Turkey declined 13 points as the government increased censorship, 
granted state agencies broad powers to block content, and charged 
more people for online expression. With social media growing as 
a tool for public discourse, authorities have shut down YouTube, 
Twitter, and other platforms for months—even years—at a time. 
Online journalists and social media users are increasingly targeted 
for assault and prosecution. 
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4Major Trends
New Legal Measures  
Curb Internet Freedom
In December 2013, as antigovernment protesters 
flooded the streets in Ukraine, Russian president 
Vladimir Putin signed a bill authorizing the prosecutor 
general to block any websites hosting “extremist” 
content or calls to protest, without judicial oversight. 
The law took effect on February 1, 2014, and was used 
immediately to crack down on digital media that car-
ried criticism of the Kremlin’s policy toward Ukraine. 
Within six weeks, three major independent news sites 
were blocked. A strikingly similar law was enacted 
in Kazakhstan in April, signifying both the spreading 
influence of repressive models for internet control— 
a so-called snowball effect—and a growing trend  
in which governments use the legal system to codify 
and legitimize their restrictions. 
While the legal measures adopted in a range of  
countries were intended to enable the development 
of information and communication technologies 
(ICTs) or protect individual rights, they also typically 
included problematic provisions with explicit restric-
tions or ambiguous language that could be abusively 
applied to legitimate online activities. These new rules 
come at a time when technological innovations are 
evolving to circumvent older methods of control, such 
as blocking and filtering.
In late 2013, for example, the research and advocacy 
group Greatfire.org began hosting content that is 
banned by the Chinese government on “unblockable” 
domains owned by Amazon and other major compa-
nies, which officials cannot risk censoring because  
of their large commercial footprint within China.  
Separately, during the September-October 2014 
prodemocracy protests in Hong Kong, concerns that 
the authorities might shut down telecommunications 
service led to widespread use of the mobile phone  
application FireChat, which enabled protesters to com-
municate through a network of Bluetooth connections.
Unable to keep up with such developments on a  
purely technical level, authorities are increasingly 
turning to their legal systems to control online activity. 
They are moving beyond the online application of  
existing, generalized tools, such as criminal defama-
tion laws, and crafting new measures that pertain 
specifically to ICTs.
Problematic new laws are emerging in democratic and 
authoritarian countries alike. Democratic states have 
Between May 2013 and May 2014, 41 countries 
passed or proposed legislation to penalize  
legitimate forms of speech online, increase  
government powers to control content, or  
expand government surveillance capabilities.
Problematic new laws are emerging  
in democratic and authoritarian  
countries alike.
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5struggled to draft legislation that adequately  
balances legitimate priorities like counterterrorism 
with the protection of citizens’ rights online. Neverthe-
less, countries with effective democratic institutions 
allow for public consultation and correction when 
laws infringe on fundamental freedoms. By contrast, 
the avenues for review of abusive laws are limited in 
nondemocratic states, compromised by closed politi-
cal systems and weak rule of law. In the most extreme 
cases, authoritarian regimes simply issue executive 
decrees or regulations that bypass any legislative or 
judicial oversight.
Most of the restrictive new legal measures docu- 
mented by Freedom on the Net 2014 fall into the 
following categories.
Bans on online dissent: While some countries opt to 
create laws with vague language that can be used to 
stifle dissent when needed, others are much more 
open about their goal of cracking down on any criti-
cism. In many cases, the penalties for online expres-
sion are worse than those for similar actions offline. 
In July 2013, for example, the Gambian government 
passed amendments to the Information and Com-
munication Act that specifically criminalized the use 
of the internet to criticize, impersonate, or spread 
false news about public officials. Anyone found guilty 
could face up to 15 years in prison, fines of roughly 
$100,000, or both—significantly harsher punishments 
than what the criminal code prescribes for the equiva-
lent offenses offline.
Restrictions targeting expression on social media 
were particularly draconian in Vietnam. Decree 72, 
enacted in September 2013, extended prohibitions 
against political or social commentary from blogs to 
all social-networking sites. Decree 174, issued that 
November, introduced fines for spreading antistate 
propaganda on social media.
Criminalization of online defamation: Measures to 
criminalize defamation online emerged as a promi-
nent trend. In May 2013, the government of Azerbai-
jan adopted legal measures that expanded criminal 
defamation to online content, further constraining 
criticism of government officials in the run-up to the 
presidential election in October. Criminal defamation 
laws are especially problematic given the ease with 
which casual remarks on social-media platforms can 
be targeted by officials for reprisal. In January 2014, a 
Zimbabwean user was arrested for calling President 
Robert Mugabe “an idiot” on his Facebook page.
Broad national security laws: Several countries  
used the pretext of national security to enact legal 
measures that allowed the potential restriction of 
legitimate speech online. In Ethiopia, a new cyberse-
curity law states that “social-media outlets, blogs, and 
other internet-related media have great capabilities 
to instigate war, to damage the country’s image, and 
create havoc in the economic atmosphere of the 
country.” The law empowers the government to  
investigate computers, networks, internet sites,  
radio and television stations, and social-media plat-
forms “for any possible damage to the country’s social, 
economic, political, and psychological well-being.”  
In the Middle East, Jordan broadened its definition  
of illegal terrorist activities to include acts that  
could damage the country’s relations with foreign 
countries, including the online publication of critical 
commentary on foreign leaders. 
Expanded powers for state regulators: Other legal 
measures provided government entities with un-
checked discretionary authority over online media 
and speech. In Kenya, a new information and com-
munications law signed in December 2013 gave the 
government-appointed regulator vaguely defined new 
powers, including the authority to impose punitive 
fines on both journalists and media houses for alleged 
ethical violations. Similarly in Ecuador, the Organ-
ic Law on Communications enacted in June 2013 
extended the communication regulator’s control over 
content to “all media with an online presence.” It was 
immediately applied to target numerous print and 
online news outlets.
Content blocking without a court order: Measures 
that empowered government agencies to block  
content without judicial oversight and with little or  
no transparency were especially notable in five 
countries—Turkey, Thailand, Russia, Kazakhstan, and 
Italy. In the less democratic countries, these laws have 
coincided with political turmoil and an urgent govern-
ment desire to suppress dissent.
In Turkey, after audio recordings implicating high- 
level officials in a corruption scandal were leaked 
on YouTube and SoundCloud, new legal measures 
In some countries, the penalties for  
online expression are worse than those  
for similar actions offline.
Freedom House
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6empowered the state regulator to block websites 
without a court order in cases that violate privacy or 
are considered “discriminatory or insulting.” The regu-
lator later blocked YouTube to suppress an unverified 
recording of a national security meeting. Twitter was 
also blocked after refusing to suspend user accounts. 
President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who was prime min-
ister at the time, has vowed to “wipe out Twitter” and 
called social media the “worst menace to society.”
In Thailand, judicial oversight is legally required when 
web content is blocked, but court orders from the 
past year undermined that requirement, allowing 
information officials to block web pages that are “sim-
ilar” to those specified in the order without seeking 
separate permission. The situation worsened follow-
ing the May 2014 coup, as military leaders issued cen-
sorship directives under martial law, blocking more 
than 200 pages in the week after they seized power. 
Excessive intermediary liability: Some new laws 
imposed criminal liability on intermediaries—such as 
ISPs and content-hosting platforms—for objection-
able content posted by others through their services. 
In Uganda, the controversial Anti-Pornography Act 
adopted in February 2014 imposed criminal penalties 
on service and content providers whose systems are 
used to upload or download broadly defined “por-
nographic” material. Although the law was annulled 
in August on a technicality, it was representative of 
a broader international trend in which companies or 
individuals face prosecution merely for providing a 
platform or network to be used by others.
Intrusive surveillance: Following the revelations 
about NSA surveillance practices, some govern-
ments have been working to pass legislation that will 
improve surveillance policies by balancing the needs 
of intelligence agencies with the protection of users’ 
rights. However, other states have enacted laws that 
further restrict individuals’ ability to communicate 
anonymously, a trend that is particularly concerning 
in countries where surveillance is regularly used to 
monitor and punish dissent. 
Of the 65 countries studied in Freedom on the Net 
2014, 19 passed new legislation that increased 
surveillance or restricted user anonymity, including 
authoritarian countries where there is no judicial  
independence or credible legal recourse for users 
whose rights have been violated. In April 2014, for 
example, Turkey passed amendments to the law on 
the National Intelligence Organization that further 
insulated the agency’s activities from judicial or media 
scrutiny. The changes empower the intelligence 
service to obtain information and electronic data from 
public bodies, private companies, and individuals 
without a court order. 
The governments of Uzbekistan and Nigeria both 
passed laws that require cybercafés to keep a log 
of their customers, and in the case of Uzbekistan, 
owners must also keep records of customers’ brows-
ing histories for up to three months. In Russia, the 
so-called “bloggers law,” passed in May 2014, in-
creased government oversight of social-media users 
by requiring anyone whose sites or pages draw over 
3,000 daily viewers to register with the telecommuni-
cations regulator. 
More democratic countries also drafted, and in some 
cases passed, potentially harmful surveillance legisla-
tion. Despite a significant outcry in France over reve-
lations that the national intelligence agency had been 
cooperating with the NSA and its British counterpart, 
in December 2013 the French legislature added an 
article to an omnibus bill on the military budget that 
extended the authorities’ legal powers to access 
or record telephone conversations, e-mail, internet 
activity, personal location data, and other electronic 
communications. The legislation provides for no judi-
cial oversight and allows electronic surveillance for a 
broad range of purposes, including “national security,” 
the protection of France’s “scientific and economical 
potential,” and prevention of “terrorism” or “criminality.”
Efforts to reform surveillance legislation in the United 
States gained momentum in the aftermath of the NSA 
revelations, though at the end of the period covered 
by this report, legislative changes were still pending. 
Notably, some of the bills drafted in Congress would 
have essentially codified existing surveillance prac-
tices. However, by mid-2014 one of the more positive 
bills, the USA Freedom Act, had garnered significant 
support from lawmakers, civil society, and the intelli-
gence community.
Of the 65 countries studied in Freedom  
on the Net 2014, 19 passed new legislation 
that increased surveillance or restricted  
user anonymity.
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7Arrests and Reprisals Increase  
for Social-Media Users
In tandem with the growing number of legal measures 
designed to restrict online speech, more people were 
detained or prosecuted for their digital activities in 
the past year than ever before. Since May 2013, ar-
rests for online communications were documented in 
38 of the 65 countries studied in Freedom on the Net 
2014, with social-media users identified as one of the 
main targets of government repression.
Nowhere was this more prevalent than in the Middle 
East and North Africa. Of the 11 countries examined 
in the region, 10 featured detentions or interrogations 
of internet users during the coverage period. Dozens 
of social-media users were arrested in Bahrain, Saudi 
Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, with many 
sentenced to jail terms of up to 10 years. Despite their 
high levels of access, the countries of the Persian 
Gulf remain some of the most restrictive for online 
freedom of expression.
Social-networking sites—the new battleground for 
governments seeking to quell protests and organized 
dissent—spurred an unprecedented volume of legal 
and extralegal detentions. Chinese police detained 
hundreds of Weibo microblog users, and indicted 
some of the most prominent, after top legal authori-
ties established 5,000 views or 500 reposts as a new 
threshold for prosecuting false, defamatory, or “harm-
ful” comments online. China has imprisoned more 
internet users than any other nation even without this 
new justification. The change, however, gave author-
ities an additional tool to punish dissidents, while 
also serving as a warning to celebrity bloggers with 
millions of followers, including members of the busi-
ness elite. Venture capitalist Charles Xue appeared 
handcuffed on state television in September 2013 to 
apologize for sharing unverified information online.
Officials in 11 countries took steps to proactively mon-
itor social media for signs of dissent and to crack down 
on users for political or social commentary. In Ethiopia, 
where one blogger is serving an 18-year sentence  
and six more face trial, the government’s Information  
Network Security Agency began scanning social media 
for “damage” to the country’s “well-being” under a No-
vember 2013 decree. Also that month, Bahrain’s state 
media announced the establishment of a Cyber Safety 
Directorate to monitor websites and social media  
for content that threatens the unity and cohesion of 
Bahraini society or that incites violence and hatred.
Government attention and reprisals often focused on 
social-media posts about political leaders. In Ban-
gladesh, supporters of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina 
accused their opponents of defaming her on Face-
book. In South Korea, where defamation comes with 
a longer sentence when committed on the internet, 
at least three people faced trial for online comments 
about President Park Geun-hye. In some countries, 
these developments have coincided with the growth 
of online platforms and their user base. 
Internet users were tried not only for what they posted 
online, but also for content found on their electronic 
devices. In Thailand, a man was sentenced to seven 
years in prison after police confiscated his computer 
and discovered pictures that were deemed insulting 
to the king. He was convicted of “attempting” to com-
mit lèse-majesté—a charge with no legal basis—as 
investigators argued that he intended to upload the 
material to the internet eventually.
Online Journalists and Bloggers  
Face Greater Pressure
The past year featured increased government pres-
sure on independent news websites, which had 
previously been among the few unfettered sources of 
information in many countries. Bloggers and online 
journalists covering antigovernment demonstrations 
faced arbitrary detention and, at times, physical vio-
lence at the hands of police or progovernment thugs. 
Dozens of citizen journalists were killed in Syria, and 
an independent reporter was fatally shot while cover-
ing an antigovernment demonstration in Egypt. Citizen 
journalists covering mass protests in Turkey and 
Ukraine were also physically assaulted. Online journal-
ists were arrested in 7 out of 12 sub-Saharan African 
countries examined in Freedom on the Net 2014.
Authorities in Jordan, Singapore, and Russia intro-
duced, updated, or enforced rules mandating that 
news sites and popular blogs obtain licenses or 
register with the government, a trend that may inhibit 
independent reporting given the fear of government 
retribution. In addition to licensing requirements, 
More people were detained or prosecuted 
for their digital activities in the past year 
than ever before.
Freedom House
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8authoritarian governments used a variety of laws to 
arrest and intimidate government critics who publish 
stories online. In Morocco, Ali Anouzla, the Arabic ed-
itor of the news site Lakome, was arrested for inciting 
terrorism after he published an article that contained 
a hyperlink to a Spanish news site, which in turn had 
embedded an extremist propaganda video. Lakome 
was subsequently blocked in one of Morocco’s first 
cases of politically motivated blocking in years.
Online journalists and others who publish indepen-
dent reporting online were arrested in at least 25 
countries during the coverage period. In Ethiopia, 
six writers from the Zone9 news blog were arrested 
in April 2014 and face charges related to accepting 
foreign funding and inciting violence through social 
media. In Iran, 16 employees of the gadget review site 
Narenji were arrested over alleged links to foreign 
governments and “anti-Iranian media,” with some 
apparently charged due to their participation in 
training programs run by the Persian service of the 
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), which the 
Iranian government linked to the British intelligence 
agency MI6. Eleven of the defendants were later found 
guilty, and the website’s founder received the heaviest 
sentence—11 years in prison.
At times, authorities used trumped-up charges with 
no link to actual reporting to punish independent jour-
nalists. In Uzbekistan, Sergey Naumov, an indepen-
dent journalist who has contributed reporting for the 
Ferghana News website, was arrested in September 
2013 on charges of hooliganism and given a 12-day 
jail sentence after he allegedly collided with a woman 
on the street, who then accused him of harassing her. 
The charges came days after Naumov began record-
ing video about forced labor practices during the 
country’s annual cotton harvest. In Azerbaijan, several 
news site editors were also arrested on apparently fab-
ricated charges of drug possession or hooliganism. In 
Belarus, a blogger who exposed police corruption was 
forced to undergo a psychiatric evaluation and faced 
harassment by police. And in Vietnam, lawyer and 
blogger Lê QuÔc Quân was sentenced to 30 months in 
prison for tax evasion, a charge that is frequently used 
by the government to silence dissidents. He had been 
arrested in 2012, shortly after publishing an article on 
the website of the BBC’s Vietnamese service.
Civil society activists who use ICTs to document 
abuse or rally supporters, or simply as a part of their 
daily lives, also faced threats. Two senior members of 
Odhikar, a nongovernmental organization (NGO) in 
Bangladesh, were arrested and charged under the ICT 
Act for “fabricating” reports of a government crack-
down on protesters to “enrage” the public. Alaa Abd 
el-Fattah, a prominent Egyptian blogger and activist, 
was sentenced to 15 years in prison in June 2014 for 
organizing a protest against military trials for civilians. 
He was not allowed to attend his own sentencing. 
Although he was released on bail pending a retrial, 
he was later rearrested. Abd el-Fattah has faced legal 
harassment from every Egyptian regime since that of 
former president Hosni Mubarak. 
’
In Iran, 16 employees of the gadget  
review site Narenji were arrested over  
alleged links to foreign governments  
and “anti-Iranian media.”
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9Emerging Threats
In addition to the clear infringements on internet 
freedom caused by the proliferation of restrictive 
laws and the rise in arrests and attacks on users and 
online journalists, Freedom House has identified three 
emerging threats that are placing the rights of inter-
net users at increasing risk: 
 •  Data localization, by which private companies  
are required to maintain data storage centers 
within a given country to allow for greater  
government control
 •  A harsh environment for women and members  
of the LGBTI (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, 
and intersex) community, who are both under- 
represented online and disproportionately  
harassed for their online activities
 •  Lack of cybersecurity for human rights activists 
and political opposition members, who have in-
creasingly been targeted with technical attacks 
and spying by repressive governments
Data Localization 
 
As governments search for ways to maintain or 
expand their jurisdiction over the online sphere, 
internet companies are finding themselves under 
increasing pressure, whether through court decisions 
that increase intermediary liability or through gov-
ernment decisions to block access to their platforms. 
Within this broader trend, proposed data localization 
requirements—obliging companies to store commu-
nications data on servers located within the country in 
question—have multiplied over the past year, in some 
cases gaining traction due to the NSA revelations. 
While these policies could create prohibitive barriers 
for companies seeking to operate in certain countries, 
they also pose significant threats to internet users’ 
rights and ability to access information, for instance 
by potentially limiting users’ choice of internet plat-
forms and subjecting them to more surveillance by 
their own governments.
Over the past year, the Russian government has sig-
nificantly stepped up efforts to exert control over the 
internet, partly by attempting to regulate the flow of 
data itself. A law signed in July 2014 requires internet 
companies to store Russian citizens’ data on servers 
in Russia. An amendment in September moved up  
the compliance date from September 1, 2016, to 
January 1, 2015, which could present a significant 
challenge for companies like Facebook and Twitter 
that do not currently have servers within the country. 
Many human rights advocates are concerned that the 
new law will make it even easier for Russian intelli-
gence agencies to access the communications data 
of Russian users, particularly activists and opposition 
figures who may then face arrests and prosecution for 
their online activities.
In July 2013, the Vietnamese government issued 
Decree 72, which, among other things, requires inter-
national internet companies to establish at least one 
server in the country, subject to local law and over-
sight. Despite the fact that numerous international 
organizations criticized the original draft of the decree 
Freedom House
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as a significant threat to free speech and privacy, the 
revised drafts maintained the data localization re-
quirement, though it remains unclear how or whether 
it will be enforced.
Many governments are understandably concerned 
about how their citizens’ information makes its way in 
and out of other countries’ jurisdictions, as the data 
may be subject to surveillance abroad. But given the 
decentralized structure of the internet, data local-
ization requirements alone will not prevent crucial 
information from flowing across borders. Indeed, 
authoritarian regimes seem to be using these policies 
for other goals, ranging from enhanced domestic 
surveillance to reduced competition for domestic 
internet companies. While data localization may  
succeed in boosting the economic success of local 
data centers, they could also have costly effects  
for other domestic businesses that rely on foreign 
internet companies.
Harassment of Women  
and LGBTI Users
Internet freedom is particularly tenuous for LGBTI 
people and women. Globally, women continue to 
face immense cultural and socioeconomic barriers 
to ICT access, resulting in a significant gender gap 
in ICT use. While increasing access to digital media 
has helped women to fight for political, social, and 
economic equality, closing the digital gender gap is 
not enough to guarantee women’s participation in the 
online sphere. Increasingly, women around the world 
are subject to harassment, threats, and violent attacks 
for their online activities, which can lead to self-cen-
sorship among female internet users and significantly 
inhibit their freedom of expression.
In some countries where fundamental rights for  
women are routinely flouted, they are increasingly tar-
geted for merely accessing ICTs. In Pakistan, a woman 
was stoned to death by local men in June 2013 after 
a tribal court convicted her of possessing a mobile 
phone. Also that month, a group of men fatally shot a 
woman and her two daughters in the country’s north 
after a video of the women laughing, which male  
family members considered shameful, circulated on 
local mobile networks.
In Azerbaijan, investigative journalist Khadija  
Ismayilova has repeatedly been subjected to blackmail 
and gender-based smear campaigns in an attempt to 
silence her and discredit her work. In India, women’s 
rights activist Kavita Krishnan was harassed online by 
a person using the handle “@RAPIST.” Digital activists 
were also penalized for documenting violence against 
women; Mukhlif al-Shammari was jailed for five years 
in June 2013, in part for posting a YouTube video on 
the mistreatment of girls in Saudi Arabia.
Members of the LGBTI community have faced 
targeted threats and harassment via ICTs, impeding 
their ability to freely use certain tools. In Egypt, there 
were reports that the authorities used the dating 
application Grindr to entrap and prosecute gay men. 
Following the adoption of Uganda’s Anti-Homosexu-
ality Act in February 2014, numerous members of the 
LGBTI community reported receiving e-mail spyware 
known as “Zeus malware” that sought to access their 
contact details and confidential information from 
compromised computers. Similarly in Russia, where the 
parliament passed a law against LGBTI “propaganda” in 
June 2013, vigilante groups used online tools to bait 
gay men, luring them to in-person encounters where 
they were physically assaulted and threatened with 
public exposure.
Lack of Cybersecurity 
 
As users have become more privacy conscious, mal-
ware attacks against government critics and human 
rights organizations have evolved to take on a more 
personalized character. Technical attacks against such 
targets were noted in 32 of the 65 countries examined 
this year. 
So-called spear phishing has emerged as one of the 
most effective techniques for hijacking online ac-
counts and collecting sensitive information. Victims 
receive customized e-mail messages that typically 
direct them to an official-looking page, run by the 
hackers, where they are prompted to enter their  
e-mail or social-media credentials. These sorts of 
attacks were employed by the Syrian Electronic Army 
against international news organizations such as the 
New York Times, Global Post, CNN, and Forbes over 
the past year. 
Internet freedom is particularly  
tenuous for LGBTI people  
and women.
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Once in control of an opposition website or social- 
media account, hackers can post hyperlinks to online 
petitions or exciting news stories to lure users into 
clicking. These links often have hidden tracking capa-
bilities that can ascertain a user’s location. According 
to a report by BahrainWatch, malicious links have 
been used to identify and arrest several anonymous 
Twitter users who were outspoken against the gov-
ernment in that country. The increased use of “social 
engineering”—essentially tricking users into revealing 
information—and account hijacking has reinforced 
the idea that one’s own digital security often depends 
on the actions and judgment of those in one’s broader 
social or professional network.
In many cases, assailants perform substantial re-
search about a target’s interests, professional connec-
tions, and personal relationships in order to create 
an individually tailored attack. For instance, bogus 
Facebook, Google, LinkedIn, and Twitter profiles have 
been set up by Iranian intelligence agents to “friend” 
foreign targets. One LinkedIn profile under the name 
of John Bolton, the former U.S. ambassador to the 
United Nations, was created to ensnare pro-Israel 
researchers and exiled members of Iran’s persecuted 
Baha’i community. Attackers sometimes spend several 
months building trust before sending a link to a rele-
vant news story that contains malicious code.
Spear-phishing victims are often prompted to down-
load a particular file that then installs a malware 
program. Hackers using this technique have targeted 
members of the Ethiopian exile community, such as 
opposition figure Tadesse Kersmo and staff at the 
Virginia-based news outlet ESAT. Researchers at the 
University of Toronto’s CitizenLab have traced the 
attacks to individuals working for or in close coordina-
tion with the Ethiopian government.
The Ethiopian example reflects a growing trend in which 
progovernment hackers are expanding their operations 
beyond national borders. In one case, attackers hijacked 
the prodemocracy site of a Vietnamese blogger living 
in California and used it to publish her personal pho-
tos and e-mails. Researchers noted that the malware 
employed was detectable by only 1 in 47 antivirus pro-
grams at the time, reflecting an unusually high level of 
sophistication that suggested state involvement. 
In Pakistan, a woman was stoned  
to death by local men in June 2013  
after a tribal court convicted her of  
possessing a mobile phone.
Freedom House
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The Global Struggle  
for Internet Freedom
Despite overall declines in global internet freedom, an 
ongoing trend of pushback from civil society was am-
plified this year by reactions to the NSA surveillance 
revelations. Awareness of the threats to fundamental 
rights expanded beyond civil society, as ordinary users 
around the world became more engaged in securing 
their privacy and freedom of expression online. In se-
lect cases, long-running internet freedom campaigns 
finally garnered the necessary momentum to succeed.
The most widely praised step forward for internet 
freedom over the past year was the passage of 
Brazil’s Marco Civil da Internet, thanks in large part to 
pressure from activists and the public. The bill, which 
had stalled in Congress after numerous debates and 
revisions, gained fresh traction following the disclo-
sure that the NSA and other intelligence agencies 
had engaged in mass collection and storage of the 
communications data of users around the world. 
The widespread alarm inspired potentially negative 
revisions to the bill, such as data localization require-
ments, but these were ultimately removed. In a more 
positive response to the NSA scandal, a Brazilian 
legislator included even stronger privacy provisions 
for user data. The final bill also contains key provisions 
restricting traffic discrimination in order to guarantee 
net neutrality, and ensuring strong protections for 
freedom of expression online. While there are still 
some problems with the final text, including the man-
datory retention of access data for six months, the 
Marco Civil was widely regarded as a positive example 
for other countries.
Popular uproar over government surveillance had 
a positive effect elsewhere in Latin America, where 
problematic proposals were halted. In Ecuador, lob-
bying efforts by the Internet Libre collective resulted 
in the defeat of Article 474 of the penal code, which 
would have forced ISPs to record all user activity for six 
months. In Argentina, community members prevented 
a government initiative to proactively monitor social- 
networking sites for potentially disruptive events, 
which opponents deemed “preemptive surveillance.”
In Europe, outrage over the NSA revelations brought 
the topic of user privacy to the center of discussions 
in the European Parliament and EU member states. 
In December 2013, the European Court of Justice 
ruled that current requirements placed on ISPs to 
indiscriminately store data on their customers were in 
contravention of Articles 7, 8, and 52(1) of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Civil 
society critics had long argued that the requirements 
of the European Data Retention Directive constituted 
mass surveillance and far exceeded what was nec-
essary for law enforcement purposes. However, the 
decision to strike down the directive has prompted 
a range of reactions among the member states, with 
some drafting their own retention laws to ensure that 
ISPs continue to store user data.
These legislative and judicial successes notably  
occurred in democratic states, where the rule of  
law prevails and governments are generally held ac- 
countable to citizens and civil society. In Brazil, for 
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example, the draft of the Marco Civil was the result of 
a collaborative process that included input from civil 
society and ordinary citizens, and it had support from 
members of Congress and the president.
In more authoritarian settings, and in democracies 
where needed reforms are still pending, individuals 
and companies have taken matters of privacy and 
freedom of expression into their own hands by using 
anonymizing and encryption tools. Products that em-
phasize user privacy have logged a notable increase in 
users since June 2013. On the anniversary of the NSA 
revelations, civil society campaigns placed an empha-
sis on educating users about available privacy tools. 
And internet companies that initially came under fire 
for cooperating with intelligence agencies or not ade-
quately protecting user data have since taken steps to 
improve their encryption standards.
Internet freedom is important not just for its own  
sake, but because it facilitates expression and  
activism on other issues. Civil society organizations 
have continued to use ICTs to advocate for positive 
change in their communities, such as the recognition 
of women’s rights in the Middle East. In Lebanon,  
online campaigns by the NGOs Nasawiya and Kafa 
contributed to the passage of a law on domestic  
violence. Since a 2013 UN report found that over  
99 percent of Egyptian women had experienced  
sexual harassment, websites such as Harassmap  
have spread awareness about the issue while provid-
ing tools for victims to report incidents and obtain 
psychological or legal support. In Saudi Arabia, a  
campaign to allow women to drive cars gained 
momentum after a dozen women posted videos of 
themselves driving in a coordinated day of action  
in October 2013.
In these and a growing number of other countries,  
the internet is a crucial medium not just for personal 
communication or news and information, but for polit-
ical participation and civic engagement. The struggle 
for internet freedom is consequently inseparable from 
the struggle for freedom of every kind.
Freedom House
http://www.freedomhouse.org
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Iceland F 0
Estonia F 0
Canada F 0
Australia F X 1
Germany F 0
United States F 0
France F X 1
Italy F X 1
Japan F 0
Hungary F X 1
United Kingdom F X 1
Georgia F 0
South Africa F X 1
Argentina F X 1
Phillipines F 0
Armenia F X 1
Kenya F X 1
Brazil F X 1
Colombia F X X 2
Nigeria PF X X X X 4
South Korea PF X X X 3
Ukraine PF X X X X 4
Kyrgyzstan PF X X X X X 5
Uganda PF X X 2
Ecuador PF X X X 3
Angola PF X X X 3
Mexico PF X X X X 4
Tunisia PF X X X 3
Singapore PF X X 2
India PF X X X X 4
Indonesia PF X X 2
Malawi PF X X 2
Malaysia PF X X X X 4
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Zambia PF X X 2
Morocco PF X X X X 4
Cambodia PF X 1
Lebanon PF X X X X 4
Jordan PF X X X 3
Libya PF X X 2
Bangladesh PF X X X X 4
Rwanda PF X X X X X 5
Azerbaijan PF X X X X X X X 7
Turkey PF X X X X X X X 7
Zimbabwe PF X X X X 4
Venezuela PF X X X X X X X X 8
Sri Lanka PF X 1
Egypt PF X X X X X 5
Kazakhstan PF X X X X X X 6
Myanmar PF X X X X 4
Russia PF X X X X X X X 7
Belarus NF X X X X 4
Thailand NF X X X X X X 6
Sudan NF X X X X X 5
The Gambia NF X X X X X X 6
United Arab Emirates NF X X X X 4
Pakistan NF X X X X X X 6
Saudi Arabia NF X X X X X X X 7
Bahrain NF X X X X X X 6
Vietnam NF X X X X X X X 7
Uzbekistan NF X X X X X X 6
Ethiopia NF X X X X X X X 7
Cuba NF X X X X X 5
China NF X X X X X X X X 8
Syria NF X X X X X X 6
Iran NF X X X X X X 6
TOTAL 17 34 13 24 21 19 38 22 32
X =  Internet control 
observed during 
the May 2013– 
May 2014  
coverage period
X =  Internet control 
observed after  
May 31, 2014 until 
the time of writing
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Freedom on the Net measures the level of internet and digital media 
freedom in 65 countries. Each country receives a numerical score from 
0 (the most free) to 100 (the least free), which serves as the basis for an 
internet freedom status designation of free (0-30 points), partly free 
(31-60 points), or not free (61-100 points). Ratings are determined 
through an examination of three broad categories: 
A. Obstacles to Access:  
Assesses infrastructural and economic barriers to access; govern- 
mental efforts to block specific applications or technologies; and legal, 
regulatory, and ownership control over internet and mobile phone 
access providers. 
B.  Limits on Content:  
Examines filtering and blocking of websites; other forms of censorship 
and self-censorship; manipulation of content; the diversity of online 
news media; and usage of digital media for social and political activism. 
C.  Violations of User Rights:  
Measures legal protections and restrictions on online activity; surveil-
lance; privacy; and repercussions for online activity, such as legal prose-
cution, imprisonment, physical attacks, or other forms of harassment.
65 Country Score Comparison
FREEDOM  
ON THE NET
2014
Tightening the Net: Governments Expand Online Controls
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Freedom on the Net 2014 assessed 65 countries  
around the globe. The project is expected to expand  
to more countries in the future.
19
Status Count
FREE  19 
PARTLY FREE  31 
NOT FREE  15
Total  65
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Freedom on the Net 2014 covers  
65 countries in 6 regions around the 
world. The countries were chosen  
to illustrate internet freedom  
improvements and declines in  
a variety of political systems.
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Internet Freedom vs. Press Freedom
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Digital media in several of the 65 countries covered was 
relatively unobstructed when compared to the more 
repressive or dangerous environment for traditional media. 
This difference is evident from the comparison between a 
country’s score on Freedom House’s Freedom on the Net 
2014 and Freedom of the Press 2014 assessments.  
 The figure above shows the 37 countries in this edition 
with a score difference of 10 points or greater. The bar graph 
characterizes a country’s Freedom on the Net 2014 score, 
while the scatterplot () represents the country’s score in 
Freedom of the Press 2014, which measures media freedom 
in the broadcast, radio, and print domains. This difference 
is cause for concern. Pressures that constrain expression 
in print or broadcast formats have the potential to exert a 
negative impact, in the short or long term, on the space for 
online expression.
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The figure above depicts the relationship between internet penetration rates  
and the level of digital media freedom in Freedom on the Net 2014. Each point 
reflects a country’s internet penetration rate, as well as its overall performance  
in the rest of the survey. 
 
The partly free countries in the middle are particularly noteworthy. As digital  
access increases, they have a choice—to move right, and join the countries  
that are high-tech but not free; or left, with the free countries that better  
protect expression.
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Freedom on the Net 2014:  
Overview of Score Changes
Overall Category Trajectories
Country FOTN 
2013
FOTN 
2014
Overall  
Trajectory
FOTN 
2014 
status
A.  
Obstacles  
to Access
B. 
Limits on 
Content
C. 
Violations of 
User Rights
Asia Bangladesh 49 49 Partly Free 12 p 12 25 q
Cambodia 47 47 Partly Free 14 15 18
China 86 87 q Not Free 19 29 39 q
India 47 42 p Partly Free 13 p 10 p 19 p
Indonesia 41 42 q Partly Free 11 12 q 19
Japan 22 22 Free 4 7 11
Malaysia 44 42 p Partly Free 8 p 14 p 20
Myanmar 62 60 p Partly Free 19 p 16 25 p
Pakistan 67 69 q Not Free 20 20 29 q
Philippines 25 27 q Free 10 5 12 q
Singapore * 40 q Partly Free 6 * 14 * 20 *
South Korea 32 33 q Partly Free 3 14 q 16
Sri Lanka 58 58 Partly Free 15 20 23
Thailand 60 62 q Not Free 11 q 21 30 q
Vietnam 75 76 q Not Free 14 28 34 q
Eurasia Armenia 29 28 p Free 7 p 9 12
Azerbaijan 52 55 q Partly Free 14 q 17 24 q
Belarus 67 62 p Not Free 15 p 20 p 27 p
Georgia 26 26 Free 8 7 11
Kazakhstan 59 60 q Partly Free 15 23 22 q
Kyrgyzstan 35 34 p Partly Free 12 9 p 13
Russia 54 60 q Partly Free 10 22 q 28 q
Turkey 49 55 q Partly Free 14 q 18 23 q
Ukraine 28 33 q Partly Free 8 q 8 q 17 q
Uzbekistan 78 79 q Not Free 20 28 31 q
Latin America Argentina 27 27 Free 7 p 9 p 11 q
Brazil 32 30 p Free 7 7 p 16 p
Colombia * 30 Free 8 * 8 * 14 *
Cuba 86 84 p Not Free 23 p 28 p 33
Ecuador 37 37 Partly Free 9 p 11 17 q
Mexico 38 39 q Partly Free 10 p 10 19 q
Venezuela 53 56 q Partly Free 17 q 18 q 21
*  Overall trajectories for the five new countries were based on a retroactive  
analysis of internet freedom for those countries.
  A Freedom on the Net score increase represents a negative trajectory (q)  
for internet freedom, while a score decrease represents a positive trajectory (p)  
for internet freedom.
Decline q
Improvement p
No change
New country in 2014  * 
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Overall Category Trajectories
Country FOTN 
2013
FOTN 
2014
Overall  
Trajectory
FOTN 
2014 
status
A.  
Obstacles  
to Access
B. 
Limits on 
Content
C. 
Violations of 
User Rights
Middle East & 
North Africa
Bahrain 72 74 q Not Free 12 q 27 q 35
Egypt 60 60 Partly Free 15 12 33
Iran 91 89 p Not Free 22 31 p 36 p
Jordan 46 48 q Partly Free 12 p 15 q 21 q
Lebanon 45 47 q Partly Free 14 12 q 21
Libya 45 48 q Partly Free 18 q 9 21 q
Morocco 42 44 q Partly Free 11 10 q 23 p
Saudi Arabia 70 73 q Not Free 15 q 24 34 q
Syria 85 88 q Not Free 25 q 26 q 37 q
Tunisia 41 39 p Partly Free 11 p 8 20 p
United Arab 
Emirates
66 67 q Not Free 14 q 22 31
Sub-Saharan 
Africa
Angola 34 38 q Partly Free 15 7 q 16 q
Ethiopia 79 80 q Not Free 23 q 28 29
Gambia, The * 65 q Not Free 19 * 21 * 25 *
Kenya 28 28 Free 9 7 12
Malawi 42 42 Partly Free 16 11 15
Nigeria 31 33 q Partly Free 10 8 15 q
Rwanda 48 50 q Partly Free 12 19 q 19 q
South Africa 26 26 Free 7 8 11
Sudan 63 65 q Not Free 18 q 19 28 q
Uganda 34 34 Partly Free 11 7 p 16 q
Zambia * 43 q Partly Free 12 * 13 * 18 *
Zimbabwe 54 55 q Partly Free 15 p 15 q 25 q
Australia, 
Canada,  
European 
Union, Iceland 
& United 
States
Australia 17 17 Free 2 5 10
Canada * 15 q Free 3 * 3 * 9 *
Estonia 9 8 p Free 1 3 4 p
France 20 20 Free 3 p 4 13 q
Germany 17 17 Free 4 4 9
Hungary 23 24 q Free 5 8 11 q
Iceland 6 6 Free 1 1 4
Italy 23 22 p Free 4 p 6 12
United Kingdom 23 24 q Free 2 6 16 q
United States 17 19 q Free 4 2 q 13 q
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Methodology 
Freedom on the Net provides analytical reports and 
numerical ratings for 65 countries worldwide. The 
countries were chosen to provide a representative 
sample with regards to geographical diversity and  
economic development, as well as varying levels  
of political and media freedom. The ratings and 
reports included in this study particularly focus on 
developments that took place between May 1, 2013 
and May 31, 2014.
What We Measure
 
The Freedom on the Net index aims to measure each 
country’s level of internet and digital media freedom 
based on a set of methodology questions described 
below (see “Checklist of Questions”). Given increasing 
technological convergence, the index also measures 
access and openness of other digital means of trans-
mitting information, particularly mobile phones and 
text messaging services. 
Freedom House does not maintain a culture-bound 
view of freedom. The project methodology is ground-
ed in basic standards of free expression, derived  
in large measure from Article 19 of the Universal  
Declaration of Human Rights:
“ Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and 
expression; this right includes freedom to hold 
opinions without interference and to seek, receive, 
and impart information and ideas through any 
media regardless of frontiers.”
This standard applies to all countries and territories,  
irrespective of geographical location, ethnic or reli-
gious composition, or level of economic development.
The project particularly focuses on the transmission 
and exchange of news and other politically relevant 
communications, as well as the protection of users’ 
rights to privacy and freedom from both legal and 
extralegal repercussions arising from their online 
activities. At the same time, the index acknowledges 
that in some instances freedom of expression and 
access to information may be legitimately restricted. 
The standard for such restrictions applied in this index 
is that they be implemented only in narrowly defined 
circumstances and in line with international human 
rights standards, the rule of law, and the principles of 
necessity and proportionality. As much as possible, 
censorship and surveillance policies and procedures 
should be transparent and include avenues for appeal 
available to those affected.
The index does not rate governments or government 
performance per se, but rather the real-world rights 
and freedoms enjoyed by individuals within each 
country. While digital media freedom may be primarily 
affected by state actions, pressures and attacks  
by nonstate actors, including the criminal under- 
world, are also considered. Thus, the index ratings 
generally reflect the interplay of a variety of actors, 
both governmental and nongovernmental, including 
private corporations. 
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The Scoring Process
 
The index aims to capture the entire “enabling envi-
ronment” for internet freedom within each country 
through a set of 21 methodology questions, divided 
into three subcategories, which are intended to 
highlight the vast array of relevant issues. Each indi-
vidual question is scored on a varying range of points. 
Assigning numerical points allows for comparative 
analysis among the countries surveyed and facilitates 
an examination of trends over time. Countries are 
given a total score from 0 (best) to 100 (worst) as well 
as a score for each sub-category. Countries scoring 
between 0 to 30 points overall are regarded as having 
a “Free” internet and digital media environment;  
31 to 60, “Partly Free”; and 61 to 100, “Not Free”. An 
accompanying country report provides narrative detail 
on the points covered by the methodology questions.
The methodology examines the level of internet  
freedom through a set of 21 questions and nearly  
100 accompanying subpoints, organized into  
three groupings:
 •  Obstacles to Access—including infrastructural 
and economic barriers to access; governmental 
efforts to block specific applications or technol-
ogies; legal and ownership control over internet 
and mobile phone access providers. 
 •  Limits on Content—including filtering and 
blocking of websites; other forms of censorship 
and self-censorship; manipulation of content; 
the diversity of online news media; and usage  
of digital media for social and political activism.
 •  Violations of User Rights—including legal  
protections and restrictions on online activity;  
surveillance and limits on privacy; and reper-
cussions for online activity, such as legal  
prosecution, imprisonment, physical attacks,  
or other forms of harassment.
The purpose of the subpoints is to guide analysts 
regarding factors they should consider while evalu-
ating and assigning the score for each methodology 
question. After researchers submitted their draft 
scores, Freedom House convened five regional review 
meetings and numerous international conference 
calls, attended by Freedom House staff and over 70 lo-
cal experts, scholars, and civil society representatives 
from the countries under study. During the meetings, 
participants reviewed, critiqued, and adjusted the 
draft scores—based on the set coding guidelines—
through careful consideration of events, laws, and 
practices relevant to each item. After completing the 
regional and country consultations, Freedom House 
staff did a final review of all scores to ensure their 
comparative reliability and integrity.
Freedom House
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Checklist of Questions 
•  Each country is ranked on a scale of 0 to 100,  
with 0 being the best and 100 being the worst.
•  A combined score of 0-30=free,  
31-60=partly free, 61-100=not free.
•  Under each question, a lower number of points  
is allotted for a more free situation, while a  
higher number of points is allotted for a less  
free environment.
•  Unless otherwise indicated, the sub-questions 
listed are meant to provide guidance as to  
what issues should be addressed under each 
methodology question, though not all will apply  
to every country. 
A.  Obstacles to Access (0-25 points)
1.  To what extent do infrastructural limitations  
restrict access to the internet and other ICTs?  
(0-6 points)
 •  Does poor infrastructure (electricity, tele-
communications, etc.) limit citizens’ ability to 
receive internet in their homes and businesses? 
 •  To what extent is there widespread public 
access to the internet through internet cafes, 
libraries, schools and other venues?
 •  To what extent is there internet and mobile 
phone access, including data connections  
or satellite?
 •  Is there a significant difference between  
internet and mobile phone penetration and  
access in rural versus urban areas or across 
other geographical divisions?
 •  To what extent are broadband services widely 
available in addition to dial-up?
2.  Is access to the internet and other ICTs  
prohibitively expensive or beyond the reach of  
certain segments of the population? (0-3 points)
 •  In countries where the state sets the price of 
internet access, is it prohibitively high?
 •  Do financial constraints, such as high costs of 
telephone/internet services or excessive taxes 
imposed on such services, make internet  
access prohibitively expensive for large  
segments of the population? 
 •  Do low literacy rates (linguistic and “digital  
literacy”) limit citizens’ ability to use  
the internet? 
 •  Is there a significant difference between  
internet penetration and access across ethnic 
or socio-economic societal divisions?
 •  To what extent are online software, news, and 
other information available in the main local 
languages spoken in the country?
3.  Does the government impose restrictions on ICT 
connectivity and access to particular social media 
and communication apps permanently or during 
specific events? (0-6 points)
 •  Does the government place limits on the 
amount of bandwidth that access providers  
can supply?
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 •  Does the government use control over  
internet infrastructure (routers, switches, etc.) 
to limit connectivity, permanently or during spe-
cific events?
 •  Does the government centralize telecommuni-
cations infrastructure in a manner that could 
facilitate control of content and surveillance? 
 •  Does the government block protocols and 
tools that allow for instant, person-to-person 
communication (VOIP, instant messaging, text 
messaging, etc.), particularly those based out-
side the country (e.g. Skype, WhatsApp, etc?) 
 •  Does the government block protocols, social 
media, and/or communication apps that allow 
for information sharing or building online 
communities (video-sharing, social-networking 
sites, comment features, blogging platforms, 
etc.) permanently or during specific events?
 •  Is there blocking of certain tools that enable 
circumvention of online filters and censors?
4.  Are there legal, regulatory, or economic obstacles 
that prevent the existence of diverse business 
entities providing access to digital technologies? 
(0-6 points)
  Note: Each of the following access providers are 
scored separately:
  1a.  Internet service providers (ISPs) and other 
backbone internet providers (0-2 points)
  1b.  Cybercafes and other businesses entities 
that allow public internet access  
(0-2 points)
  1c.  Mobile phone companies (0-2 points)
 •  Is there a legal or de facto monopoly over ac-
cess providers or do users have a choice of ac-
cess provider, including ones privately owned? 
 •  Is it legally possible to establish a private access 
provider or does the state place extensive legal 
or regulatory controls over the establishment of 
providers?
 •  Are registration requirements (i.e. bureaucratic 
“red tape”) for establishing an access provider 
unduly onerous or are they approved/rejected 
on partisan or prejudicial grounds? 
 •  Does the state place prohibitively high  
fees on the establishment and operation  
of access providers? 
5.  To what extent do national regulatory bodies 
overseeing digital technology operate in a free, 
fair, and independent manner? (0-4 points) 
 •  Are there explicit legal guarantees protecting 
the independence and autonomy of any regu-
latory body overseeing internet and other ICTs 
(exclusively or as part of a broader mandate) 
from political or commercial interference?
 •  Is the process for appointing members of regu-
latory bodies transparent and representative of 
different stakeholders’ interests?
 •  Are decisions taken by the regulatory body, 
particularly those relating to ICTs, seen to be 
fair and apolitical and to take meaningful notice 
of comments from stakeholders in society?
 •  Are efforts by access providers and other inter-
net-related organizations to establish self-regu-
latory mechanisms permitted and encouraged?
 •  Does the allocation of digital resources, such 
as domain names or IP addresses, on a national 
level by a government-controlled body create 
an obstacle to access or are they allocated in a 
discriminatory manner?
B. Limits on Content (0-35 points)
1.  To what extent does the state or other actors 
block or filter internet and other ICT content, par-
ticularly on political and social issues? (0-6 points)
 •  Is there significant blocking or filtering of  
internet sites, web pages, blogs, or data  
centers, particularly those related to political 
and social topics? 
 •  Is there significant filtering of text messages or 
other content transmitted via mobile phones?
 •  Do state authorities block or filter information 
and views from inside the country—particularly 
concerning human rights abuses, government 
corruption, and poor standards of living—from 
reaching the outside world through intercep-
tion of email or text messages, etc?
 •  Are methods such as deep-packet inspection 
used for the purposes of preventing users from 
accessing certain content or for altering the 
content of communications en route to the 
recipient, particularly with regards to political 
and social topics? 
Freedom House
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2.  To what extent does the state employ legal, 
administrative, or other means to force deletion 
of particular content, including requiring private 
access providers to do so? (0-4 points)
 •  To what extent are non-technical measures—ju-
dicial or extra-legal—used to order the deletion 
of content from the internet, either prior to or 
after its publication?
 •  To what degree does the government or other 
powerful political actors pressure or coerce on-
line news outlets to exclude certain information 
from their reporting? 
 •  Are access providers and content hosts legally 
responsible for the information transmitted 
via the technology they supply or required to 
censor the content accessed or transmitted by 
their users?
 •  Are access providers or content hosts prose-
cuted for opinions expressed by third parties via 
the technology they supply? 
3.  To what extent are restrictions on internet and 
ICT content transparent, proportional to the 
stated aims, and accompanied by an independent 
appeals process? (0-4 points) 
 •  Are there national laws, independent oversight 
bodies, and other democratically accountable 
procedures in place to ensure that decisions to 
restrict access to certain content are propor-
tional to their stated aim?
 •  Are state authorities transparent about what 
content is blocked or deleted (both at the level 
of public policy and at the moment the censor-
ship occurs)?
 •  Do state authorities block more types of con-
tent than they publicly declare?
 •  Do independent avenues of appeal exist for 
those who find content they produced to have 
been subjected to censorship?
4.  Do online journalists, commentators, and ordinary 
users practice self-censorship? (0-4 points)
 •  Is there widespread self-censorship by online 
journalists, commentators, and ordinary users 
in state-run online media, privately run web-
sites, or social media applications? 
 •  Are there unspoken “rules” that prevent an 
online journalist or user from expressing certain 
opinions in ICT communication? 
 
 •  Is there avoidance of subjects that can clearly 
lead to harm to the author or result in almost 
certain censorship?
5.  To what extent is the content of online sources  
of information determined or manipulated by  
the government or a particular partisan interest? 
(0-4 points)
 •  To what degree do the government or other 
powerful actors pressure or coerce online news 
outlets to follow a particular editorial direction 
in their reporting?
 •  Do authorities issue official guidelines or  
directives on coverage to online media  
outlets, blogs, etc., including instructions to 
marginalize or amplify certain comments or 
topics for discussion? 
 •  Do government officials or other actors bribe or 
use close economic ties with online journalists, 
bloggers, website owners, or service providers 
in order to influence the online content they 
produce or host? 
 •  Does the government employ, or encourage 
content providers to employ, individuals to 
post pro-government remarks in online bulletin 
boards and chat rooms? 
 •  Do online versions of state-run or partisan  
traditional media outlets dominate the online 
news landscape?
6.  Are there economic constraints that negatively 
impact users’ ability to publish content online or 
online media outlets’ ability to remain financially 
sustainable? (0-3 points)
 •  Are favorable connections with government 
officials necessary for online media outlets or 
service providers (e.g. search engines, email 
applications, blog hosting platforms, etc.) to be 
economically viable?
 •  Are service providers who refuse to follow 
state-imposed directives to restrict content 
subject to sanctions that negatively impact 
their financial viability?
 •  Does the state limit the ability of online media 
to accept advertising or investment, particularly 
from foreign sources, or does it limit advertis-
ers from conducting business with disfavored 
online media or service providers?
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 •  To what extent do ISPs manage network traffic 
and bandwidth availability to users in a manner 
that is transparent, evenly applied, and does 
not discriminate against users or producers of 
content based on the content/source of the 
communication itself (i.e. respect “net neutrali-
ty” with regard to content)?
 •  To what extent do users have access to free 
or low-costs blogging services, webhosts, etc. 
to allow them to make use of the internet to 
express their own views?
7.  To what extent are sources of information that are 
robust and reflect a diversity of viewpoints readily 
available to citizens, despite government efforts 
to limit access to certain content? (0-4 points)
 •  Are people able to access a range of local and 
international news sources via the internet or 
text messages, despite efforts to restrict the 
flow of information?
 •  Does the public have ready access to media 
outlets or websites that express independent, 
balanced views?
 •  Does the public have ready access to sources 
of information that represent a range of political 
and social viewpoints?
 •  To what extent do online media outlets and 
blogs represent diverse interests within  
society, for example through websites run  
by community organizations or religious,  
ethnic and other minorities? 
 •  To what extent do users employ proxy servers 
and other methods to circumvent state  
censorship efforts? 
8.  To what extent have individuals successfully used 
the internet and other ICTs as sources of informa-
tion and tools for mobilization, particularly regard-
ing political and social issues? To what extent are 
such mobilization tools available without govern-
ment restriction? (0-6 points)
 •  To what extent does the online community cov-
er political developments and provide scrutiny 
of government policies, official corruption, or 
the behavior of other powerful societal actors? 
 •  To what extent are online communication tools 
or social networking sites (e.g. Twitter,  
Facebook) used as a means to organize  
politically, including for “real-life” activities?
 
 •  Are mobile phones and other ICTs used  
as a medium of news dissemination and  
political organization, including on other- 
wise banned topics?
C. Violations of User Rights (0-40 points)
1.  To what extent does the constitution or other laws 
contain provisions designed to protect freedom of 
expression, including on the internet, and are they 
enforced? (0-6 points) 
 •  Does the constitution contain language that 
provides for freedom of speech and of the  
press generally?
 •  Are there laws or legal decisions that specifical-
ly protect online modes of expression? 
 •  Are online journalists and bloggers accorded 
the same rights and protections given to print 
and broadcast journalists?
 •  Is the judiciary independent and do the 
Supreme Court, Attorney General, and other 
representatives of the higher judiciary support 
free expression?
 •  Is there implicit impunity for private and/or 
state actors who commit crimes against online 
journalists, bloggers, or other citizens targeted 
for their online activities? 
2.  Are there laws which call for criminal penalties  
or civil liability for online and ICT activities?  
(0-4 points)
 •  Are there specific laws criminalizing online 
expression and activity such as posting or 
downloading information, sending an email,  
or text message, etc.? (Note: this excludes  
legislation addressing harmful content such  
as child pornography or activities such as  
malicious hacking) 
 •  Do laws restrict the type of material that can 
be communicated in online expression or via 
text messages, such as communications about 
ethnic or religious issues, national security, or 
other sensitive topics?
 •  Are restrictions of internet freedom closely de-
fined, narrowly circumscribed, and proportional 
to the legitimate aim?
 •  Are vaguely worded penal codes or security laws 
applied to internet-related or ICT activities?
 •  Are there penalties for libeling officials or the 
state in online content?
Freedom House
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 •  Can an online outlet based in another country 
be sued if its content can be accessed from 
within the country (i.e. “libel tourism”)?
3.  Are individuals detained, prosecuted or  
sanctioned by law enforcement agencies for 
disseminating or accessing information on the 
internet or via other ICTs, particularly on political 
and social issues? (0-6 points)
 •  Are writers, commentators, or bloggers subject 
to imprisonment or other legal sanction as a 
result of posting material on the internet?
 •  Are citizens subject to imprisonment, civil  
liability, or other legal sanction as a result of 
accessing or downloading material from the in-
ternet or for transmitting information via email 
or text messages? 
 •  Does the lack of an independent judiciary or 
other limitations on adherence to the rule of law 
hinder fair proceedings in ICT-related cases? 
 •  Are individuals subject to abduction or arbitrary 
detention as a result of online activities, includ-
ing membership in certain online communities?
 •  Are penalties for “irresponsible journalism” or 
“rumor mongering” applied widely?
 •  Are online journalists, bloggers, or others regu-
larly prosecuted, jailed, or fined for libel or defa-
mation (including in cases of “libel tourism”)?
4.  Does the government place restrictions on  
anonymous communication or require user  
registration? (0-4 points)
 •  Are website owners, bloggers, or users in gener-
al required to register with the government? 
 •  Are users able to post comments online or 
purchase mobile phones anonymously or does 
the government require that they use their real 
names or register with the government? 
 •  Are users prohibited from using encryption 
software to protect their communications? 
 •  Are there laws restricting the use of encryption 
and other security tools, or requiring that the 
government be given access to encryption keys 
and algorithms?
5.  To what extent is there state surveillance of 
internet and ICT activities without judicial or 
other independent oversight, including systematic 
retention of user traffic data? (0-6 points)
 •  Do the authorities regularly monitor web-
sites, blogs, and chat rooms, or the content of 
email and mobile text messages, including via 
deep-packet inspection?
 •  To what extent are restrictions on the privacy 
of digital media users transparent, proportional 
to the stated aims, and accompanied by an 
independent process for lodging complaints  
of violations? 
 •  Where the judiciary is independent, are there 
procedures in place for judicial oversight of sur-
veillance and to what extent are these followed?
 •  Where the judiciary lacks independence, is 
there another independent oversight body in 
place to guard against abusive use of surveil-
lance technology and to what extent is it able  
to carry out its responsibilities free of govern-
ment interference?
 •  Is content intercepted during internet surveil-
lance admissible in court or has it been used to 
convict users in cases involving free speech?
6.  To what extent are providers of access to digital 
technologies required to aid the government in 
monitoring the communications of their users? 
(0-6 points)
  Note: Each of the following access providers are 
scored separately:
  6a.  Internet service providers (ISPs) and other 
backbone internet providers (0-2 points)
  6b.  Cybercafes and other business entities 
that allow public internet access  
(0-2 points)
  6c.  Mobile phone companies (0-2 points)
 •  Are access providers required to monitor their 
users and supply information about their digital 
activities to the government (either through 
technical interception or via manual monitor-
ing, such as user registration in cybercafes)?
 •  Are access providers prosecuted for not  
doing so?
 •  Does the state attempt to control access 
providers through less formal methods, such as 
codes of conduct?
 •  Can the government obtain information about 
users without a legal process? 
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7.  Are bloggers, other ICT users, websites, or their 
property subject to extralegal intimidation or 
physical violence by state authorities or any other 
actor? (0–5 points)
 •  Are individuals subject to murder, beatings, 
harassment, threats,  travel restrictions, or 
torture as a result of online activities, including 
membership in certain online communities?
 •  Do armed militias, organized crime elements, 
insurgent groups, political or religious extrem-
ists, or other organizations regularly target 
online commentators?
 •  Have online journalists, bloggers, or others  
fled the country or gone into hiding to avoid 
such action?
 •  Have cybercafes or property of online com-
mentators been targets of physical attacks or 
the confiscation or destruction of property as 
retribution for online activities or expression?
8.  Are websites, governmental and private entities, 
ICT users, or service providers subject to  
widespread “technical violence,” including  
cyberattacks, hacking, and other malicious 
threats? (0-3 points)  
 •  Are financial, commercial, and governmental 
entities subject to significant and targeted cy-
berattacks (e.g. cyberespionage, data gathering, 
DDoS attacks), including those originating from 
outside of the country? 
 •  Have websites belonging to opposition or civil 
society groups within the country’s boundaries 
been temporarily or permanently disabled due 
to cyberattacks, particularly at politically sensi-
tive times?
 •  Are websites or blogs subject to targeted tech-
nical attacks as retribution for posting certain 
content (e.g. on political and social topics)?
 •  Are laws and policies in place to prevent and 
protect against cyberattacks (including the 
launching of systematic attacks by nonstate 
actors from within the country’s borders) and 
are they enforced?
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The internet is a crucial  
medium not just for personal 
communication or news and  
information, but for political  
participation and civic  
engagement. The struggle for  
internet freedom is consequently 
inseparable from the struggle  
for freedom of every kind.
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